The court ruled on summary judgment in a preference action that a "payment rights purchase and sale agreement" executed between the debtor and a funding company during the preference period was a sale of receivables and not a loan. After analyzing U.C.C. law on general intangibles and payment intangibles, the court determined the assets sold were in fact accounts and not intangibles, and the creditor's interest was unperfected, so the assets were property of the bankruptcy estate.

A landlord filed a request for payment of an administrative expense claim for the difference between the amount of post-petition rent it claimed it was due and the amount the debtor actually paid. In December 2018, shortly before the debtor filed bankruptcy in January 2019, it asked the landlord to make some rent concessions to allow the debtor to keep its store open and not reject the lease immediately upon filing its petition. The landlord agreed to, and accepted payment of, a reduced rental rate. The debtor then rejected the lease and closed the store in late April 2019.

The court granted summary judgment against one defendant in favor of the Chapter 7 trustee, permitting him to recover unauthorized post-petition transfers made by the debtor. The evidence established (1) the funds were property of the bankruptcy estate; (2) the property was transferred; (3) the transfer was made post-petition; and (4) the transfer was not authorized by the Bankruptcy Code or the bankruptcy court. The court declined to enter summary judgment as to the remaining defendants because the evidence did not support an alter ego theory.

The court denied a pharmaceutical supplier's administrative expense claim based on alleged reclamation rights, finding that the supplier did not have a valid reclamation claim under § 546(c) or the right to exercise the equitable doctrine of asset marshaling.

After trial on whether the debtor was insolvent when it made transfers to three defendants, the court ruled the transfers were fraudulent because the debtor was not paying its debts as they became due. (The other elements of the fraudulent transfers had previously been established on summary judgment.) Transfers to a fourth defendant were found not to be fraudulent because the defendant was a "mere conduit" for the transfers and did not exercise dominion or control over the funds.

An agricultural production input supplier filed a financing statement to perfect its statutory lien against the debtors' crops and crop proceeds, but the financing statement did not contain the information required by the Nebraska agricultural production inputs lien statutes, so the lien was unperfected. Under the Uniform Commercial Code's priority rules, a perfected security interest has priority over a conflicting unperfected agricultural lien, so a lender's prior perfected security interest took priority in the available proceeds.

After a trial in two related adversary proceedings on complaints seeking denial of discharge under § 727 or the exception of a debt from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(B), the court ruled in favor of the debtors.

The court granted partial summary judgment to the Chapter 11 trustee on the issue of reasonably equivalent value in this action to avoid certain allegedly fraudulent transfers by the debtor to third parties. The evidence did not support the defendants' "identity of interests" and "indirect benefits" defenses.

The court granted summary judgment to the debtor in a non-dischargeability action under § 523(a)(4) brought by a defendant in a state-court lawsuit filed by a creditor of the debtor. The debtor had purchased cattle from the state-court plaintiff, a livestock auction company, for resale to the state-court defendant, a cattle feeding operation. The cattle feeder paid the debtor for the cattle, but the debtor's check to the auction company was dishonored and remains unpaid.

After a trial, the court denied a discharge to a debtor who omitted assets and pre-petition asset sales and payments from his bankruptcy schedules and statement of financial affairs. The court found these omissions and misstatements to constitute false oaths and to be material.