On reconsideration, the court held that the Chapter 13 debtors lacked standing to attempt to avoid as a preference a consensual purchase-money lien on their vehicle, in which they did not claim an exemption, under the provisions of § 522(h) and (g)(1).

The court granted relief for cause to debtor's primary secured creditor on collateral other than debtor's patent because it lacked adequate protection. There was no evidence the patent would decrease in value while debtor tried to obtain capital.

The debtor's motion for summary judgment was denied because there were factual issues on the creditor's §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6) causes of action. The debtor's motion to strike certain evidence was denied because foundation had been laid.

The debtor's ex-wife moved to have domestic support obligations and property settlement debts excepted from discharge under §§ 523(a)(5) and (a)(15). The debtor challenged only the amount of the debts, which should have been done in state court.

The debtor's lease of real property required him to pay "special assessments," including levies for road construction and water treatment. The court deferred debtor's proposed assumption of the lease because the benefit to the estate was unclear.

The plaintiff had a contract with the debtor's companies. The companies did not remit certain proceeds to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was unable to establish that the debt was non-dischargeable as to the debtor under § 523(a)(2), (a)(4), or (a)(6).

A default judgment against the debtor for the intentional torts of assault and battery was not dischargeable in Chapter 13 because it was a debt for personal injury damages awarded in a civil action for willful or malicious injuries caused by debtor.

The court denied debtors' motion to assume an unexpired lease of farmland. The debtors were in default on the lease because they had not paid any rent for the year, and they lacked the ability to cure the default and offer adequate assurance to the owner.

Debtor's removal of certain appliances, cabinets, carpet, ceiling fans, etc., from her house prior to foreclosure did not constitute a willful & malicious injury to the lienholder under § 523(a)(6) because the debtor had no intent to harm the lender.

The debtors own and occupy two adjacent lots and houses. One debtor resides in the second house to care for her father-in-law, although all family members regularly use both houses. The debtors may claim their homestead exemption in the second house.