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United States Courts Opinions

United States Courts Opinions (USCOURTS) collection is a collaborative effort between the U.S. Government Publishing Office (GPO) and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC) to provide public access to opinions from selected United States appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts.

The District of Nebraska offers a database of opinions for the years 1997 to current, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.

Christina D'Saachs v. Jayme Davis Sell & Andra Lynne Sell (In re Sell), Ch. 7, BK25-80501-BSK, A25-8010-BSK (Mar. 17, 2026) 03/17/2026
Judge Brian S. Kruse

The court denied the debtor-defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that factual issues as to intent require a trial.

The plaintiff lent money to the debtor to pay off existing debt, and the parties signed a loan agreement under which the debtor made some payments. The debtor continued to incur debt, from other lenders and by withdrawing money from the plaintiff’s account, without making much progress on repaying the plaintiff. In 2024, the plaintiff sued the debtor, obtaining a judgment and garnishment order. The debtor began exploring bankruptcy options and asked the plaintiff to release the garnishment. The parties corresponded, with the plaintiff asking for payment assurances and the debtor repeatedly stating the plaintiff would be repaid through the bankruptcy case.

The debtor and his wife filed their Chapter 7 petition in 2025, and the plaintiff filed this adversary proceeding to except the judgment debt from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A) for fraud and to deny the debtors a discharge under § 727(a)(4)(A) for making a false oath or account by failing to include certain monthly rental assistance in their schedules, and by making inaccurate pre-petition statements about the dischargeability of the plaintiff’s claim.

The debtors moved for summary judgment on both claims, but the court denied the motion because the debtor’s intent is a genuine issue of material fact. On the § 523(a)(2)(A) claim, the court said the debtor’s credibility is an important aspect of ascertaining intent: “Did Mr. Sell intend to repay the plaintiff? Was Mr. Sell ‘using’ the plaintiff in a scheme to get money? These unresolved issues preclude summary judgment because ‘[a] material promise to perform in the future made with the intent to defraud and without the intent to perform . . . constitutes actionable fraud.’”

Likewise, on the §727(a)(4) claim, the court, after discounting the weight of the debtor’s inaccurate statements about bankruptcy’s effect on his debt to the plaintiff, said a trial will be necessary to determine the debtors’ intent regarding the initial failure to disclose the rental assistance: “The debtors’ intent is material and disputed. Given the potential cumulative effect of the facts in evidence, the debtors’ intent regarding the omission of the rental assistance comes down to credibility. On this record, it is not established for purposes of summary judgment.”

Richard N. Berkshire, Ch. 7, BK25-80366 (Mar. 12, 2026) 03/12/2026
Judge Brian S. Kruse

The bankruptcy court granted the Chapter 7 trustee’s motion to sell residential real estate over the objection of the debtor (who lacked standing) and several holders of construction liens on the property.

While the mortgage-holder consented to the sale, a judgment lien creditor neither consented nor objected. The court noted, first, failure to object implies consent, and second, a §363 sale can occur if the non-consenting entity’s interest is in bona fide dispute. Here, the debtor is vigorously disputing the validity of the underlying judgment, so the creditor’s interest is in bona fide dispute. Even if the creditor’s implied consent is insufficient under § 362(f)(2), the sale is independently authorized under § 363(f)(4).

Likewise, the subcontractors’ interests are also objectively subject to a bona fide dispute because the debtor was not authorized to incur debt to complete construction of the house. Moreover, the post-petition filing of the construction liens violated the automatic stay, which may render them void or voidable.

The court also ruled that, contrary to the assertion of one of the creditors, there is indeed a benefit to the estate from the sale because the mortgage holder has agreed to a carve-out for unsecured creditors and because certain administrative expenses can be surcharged against the sale proceeds under § 506(c).

Finally, the court addressed the debtor’s argument that the Chapter 7 trustee is serving without a sufficient bond. The U.S. Trustee is responsible for determining the amount and sufficiency of a case trustee’s bond under §322(b) and the current bond is satisfactory to the U.S. Trustee. The court has little tolerance for the debtor’s “misguided and ill-conceived” efforts to impede the trustee and avoid liquidation of estate assets.

Benjamin & Brittany Thompson, Ch. 13, BK25-41293-BSK (Mar. 10, 2026) 03/10/2026
Judge Brian S. Kruse

The bankruptcy court denied the debtors’ motion for turnover of funds from a pre-petition garnishment because the garnishment must first be avoided through an adversary proceeding. The court also denied the debtors’ request for sanctions under §362(k) for willful violation of the automatic stay for not releasing the garnishment upon learning of the bankruptcy case. The court noted that debtors and creditors share responsibility for getting garnishments released. Here, the court found it to be a failure of the parties to communicate about stopping the garnishment rather than a willful violation.

In re EAD Constructors, Inc., Ch. 11, BK25-81134-BSK (Mar. 5, 2026) 03/05/2026
Judge Brian S. Kruse

The bankruptcy court granted relief from the automatic stay to permit arbitration to continue.

The movant is an entity that had hired the debtor for engineering, procurement, and construction services. The movant alleged mismanagement and contract breaches by the debtor and began arbitration proceedings in 2023. Days before the arbitration hearing was to begin, the debtor filed its Chapter 11 bankruptcy case.

The court noted a strong federal policy favoring arbitration and enforcement of arbitration clauses in contracts, and examined the intersection of the enforcement of such clauses with the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code such as centralized resolution of purely bankruptcy issues, protecting parties from piecemeal litigation, and the clear power of a bankruptcy court to enforce its own orders. The court found that allowing arbitration to continue would not undermine or conflict with the Code’s objectives because: (1) no other parties in interest objected to the motion for relief or expressed concern about the movant’s claim not being decided in a public proceeding; (2) while the debtor’s appeal rights are limited in arbitration, that is the process to which the parties agreed; and (3) although piecemeal litigation is a risk, that risk exists whether the claims are resolved in arbitration or in state or federal court.  

The court then found cause for granting stay relief under § 362(d)(1), given that judicial economy and trial readiness are two factors that heavily favor arbitration. The burdens to the bankruptcy estate – such as cost of defense and the erosion of its wasting indemnity insurance coverage – are not insignificant but would exist regardless of where the claim is decided, so that factor also favors granting relief to arbitrate. The court added that relief was granted only to obtain a final arbitration award, but not to enforce any such award absent further order of the court.

Richard N. Berkshire, Ch. 7, BK25-80366-BSK (Mar. 4, 2026) 03/04/2026
Judge Brian S. Kruse

The bankruptcy court granted in part the United States Trustee’s motion to examine the fees of debtor’s counsel. The court ordered full disgorgement of all post-petition fees paid, along with any pre-petition retainers.

The court ordered debtor’s counsel to disgorge all post-petition fees received in the Chapter 11 case because they were not authorized or approved. Counsel argued that he didn’t need court approval because he was paid from the proceeds of an exempt IRA, but the court pointed out those funds became property of the estate when they were withdrawn and deposited into the debtor’s checking account. The court also ruled the fees were unreasonable because the amount of attorney’s fees paid exceeded the reasonable value of the services provided. The court found that counsel “assisted the debtor in making incomplete and inaccurate filings, assisted the debtor in filing a clearly unconfirmable and wholly self-serving Chapter 11 plan, stonewalled the U.S. Trustee, and was legal counsel while the debtor dissipated the bankruptcy estate. Moreover, the bankruptcy was ill-conceived given the debtor’s breach of fiduciary duties, which necessitated the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee. [Counsel]’s conduct cost the estate more than any value he provided.”

The U.S. Trustee also challenged pre-petition payments made to debtor’s counsel, but the court denied the request to disgorge those funds because the trustee did not make a prima facie showing that the payments were “in contemplation of bankruptcy” under § 329, so the issues of disclosure and reasonableness under § 329 did not arise.

Finally, because the billing records submitted by debtor’s counsel appeared to be unreliable, at best, and possibly intentionally false, the court scheduled a show-cause hearing to determine whether counsel should be permitted to continue practicing in bankruptcy court. See Fil. No. 533.

Michael L. Watson, Ch. 7, BK25-80538-BSK (Dec. 18, 2025) 12/18/2025
Judge Brian S. Kruse

On a creditor’s motion to alter or amend an order avoiding judicial liens against the debtor’s house, the bankruptcy court clarified: “The order avoiding [the creditor’s] lien went only as far as the debtor represented in his schedules and requested in his motion. [The creditor's] lien was avoided on the debtor's 50% interest in the property. No finding regarding the other 50% interest was made or intended. To the extent the order avoiding lien could be construed as avoiding the lien on any interest the debtor had in the other 50%, it is altered and amended.”

BP P'ship, LP v. Richard N. Berkshire (In re Berkshire), Ch. 11, BK25-80366-BSK, A25-8007-BSK (Oct. 8, 2025) 10/08/2025
Judge Brian S. Kruse

The debtor’s family limited partnership filed an adversary proceeding seeking to except from discharge a $2.865 million judgment it obtained against the debtor. The partners include the debtor, two of his sisters, and a brother-in-law. In response, the debtor filed a counterclaim and third-party complaint regarding his late mother’s trust, alleging causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with a business expectancy, and conspiracy. The defendants are the sisters, brother-in-law, and the trustee of the mother’s trust. The debtor asserts the defendants have wrongly withheld from him the distribution of funds from his mother’s trust, and that his plan of reorganization is to use those funds to pay the judgment debt.

In granting the third-party defendants’ motion to dismiss, the bankruptcy court found the debtor lacked standing because the claims he asserts belong to the Chapter 11 trustee appointed in this case unless the trustee abandons them.

The bankruptcy court further ruled that the third-party defendants were improperly impleaded. The debtor may bring a permissive counterclaim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and implead additional parties liable on the counterclaim under Rule 20. However, joinder requires a valid counterclaim, which is missing in this case. The adversary plaintiff is the family partnership, but the third-party complaint seeks relief against individual members of the partnership, not the partnership itself, which is the real party in interest. “Because the partnership is not a counterclaimant, the counterclaim fails. As the counterclaim falls, so falls the third-party complaint.”

The court dismissed the counterclaim and third-party complaint as not properly before the court. Even if they were properly before the court, the bankruptcy court would abstain from hearing them because the matters concerning the mother’s trust are presently before the probate court.

Michael Watson, Ch. 7, BK25-80538-BSK (Oct. 3, 2025) 10/03/2025
Judge Brian S. Kruse

The bankruptcy court avoided a judgment creditor’s lien that impaired the debtor’s homestead exemption. The creditor focused on two main arguments: (1) that the debtor had abandoned the home when he moved out after a marital separation, and (2) that even though the debtor moved back in after his wife and children moved out, he could not reestablish it as his homestead because he did not reside there with his family at that time.

The court found that although the debtor lived in other locations after his marital separation, he did not abandon or intend to abandon his homestead rights in the family home:

Abandonment must be “total, without any occupancy under claim of homestead.” Dennis v. Omaha Nat’l Bank, 28 N.W. 512, 514–15 (Neb. 1886) (emphasis added). The debtor or [his wife] always resided in their family home. They remained married at the time the bankruptcy was filed. The debtor’s absence from the home beginning in 2023 was due to a marital dispute and divorce filing, it being agreed as in the best interest of the debtor’s children, who also resided there. Even if he spent nights or resided at his girlfriend’s apartment, the debtor returned to his home after [his wife] moved out. Although the debtor and [his wife] agreed to sell the house and obtained a court order to list it for sale, the house is not sold. The debtor’s rental of a house with his girlfriend was temporary, regardless of whether he remains liable on the lease. The debtor’s personal property has always been at his home. And [his wife] did not testify she intended to abandon the home or her homestead rights.

In response to the creditor’s second argument, the court pointed out the Nebraska homestead exemption statute no longer focuses on protecting the family home. Rather, recent amendments to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 40-101 allow any natural person to claim a $120,000 exemption in their home. “The debtor is a natural person. He lives in his home. He claimed it as exempt. As a result of the amendment, it is not necessary the debtor’s wife or children live with the debtor after March 2025.”

Because the total amount of the judicial lien and consensual liens on the property plus the homestead exemption, less the value of the debtor’s one-half interest in the property, impair the debtor’s claimed exemption, the judicial lien is avoided in full.

Colton & Stephanie Osborn, Ch. 12, BK24-40202-BSK (Sept. 12, 2025) 09/12/2025
Judge Brian S. Kruse

The bankruptcy court granted the bank’s motion for attorney fees, provided for in the loan documents, under §506(b). However, the earlier settlement between the debtor and the bank that determined the amount of the bank’s allowed secured claim essentially rendered this fee decision “a hollow undertaking” because the fees were effectively disallowed by the settlement as not chargeable to the debtor or any collateral owned by the debtor, so this decision “will not affect the bankruptcy case in the slightest.” The court noted that if it disallowed the $295,000 in fees as unreasonable, those fees might still be allowed as an unsecured claim, and a disallowance under federal law may not be preclusive under state law. Accordingly, the court held: “Regarding the fees and costs, considering the unique circumstances of the case, specifically including the fact the fees will not be paid, the fees are ‘reasonable’ under federal law solely for purposes of a Chapter 12 plan under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b). The court makes no determination as to whether the fees are reasonable under state law[.] . . . The debtors are not personally obligated to pay more than th[e] recourse obligation amount [in the settlement agreement] and the bank is not entitled to any distribution as an unsecured creditor.”

Jennifer M. Lennemann, Ch. 11, BK24-40046-BSK (Sept. 5, 2025) 09/05/2025
Judge Brian S. Kruse

The bankruptcy court enjoined a deed of trust sale that was based on a pre-petition default under loan documents that were restructured by the terms of the debtor’s confirmed Chapter 11 plan.

The debtor’s debts to the bank are secured by deeds of trust against multiple parcels of real estate. Pre-petition, the borrower defaulted on her loan payments and the bank filed and served notices under the Nebraska Trust Deeds Act. The debtor then filed a Chapter 11 petition and her plan was confirmed. Provisions in the plan modified, superseded, and replaced the debtor’s original obligations to the bank. 

The debtor subsequently failed to timely pay real estate taxes, which was a default under the plan. The bank notified the debtor of the default and the cure period. The debtor paid the real estate taxes in June 2025 shortly after the cure period expired. Nevertheless, the bank moved ahead with the deed of trust sale process that it had initiated pre-petition and published notice of sale with a sale date in August 2025. The debtor then moved for a temporary restraining order and injunction to stop the sale.

While the bank argued that the plan simply stayed enforcement of the pre-petition deed of trust foreclosure as long as the debtor continued to meet all plan obligations to the bank, the court pointed out that a confirmed plan modifies a debtor’s obligations and a creditor’s lien rights. A reorganized debtor is free of pre-confirmation obligations except to the extent they are provided for in the confirmed plan, and the confirmed plan is a new enforceable contract between the parties.

Accordingly, the bank could not enforce the pre-petition payment default nor rely on the pre-petition notice of default under the Trust Deeds Act. Instead, the bank was required to file a new notice of default identifying the debtor’s breach of her modified obligations to the bank under the plan – the failure to timely pay real estate taxes. Because the debtor has cured the default by paying the taxes, the bank is precluded from foreclosing.

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